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Deforestation and the Real Exchange Rate
Abstract
Deforestation is a phenomenon that has largely been concentrated in the developing world. We
construct a theoretical model of deforestation that focuses on the factors aﬀecting the incentives
to transform forested land into agricultural land. We show that: (i) lower discount rates (as-
sociated with higher income levels), stronger institutions, and increases in the relative price of
timber decrease deforestation; (ii) depreciations in the real exchange rate increase deforestation
in developing countries whereas the opposite obtains in developed countries; (iii) paradoxically,
better institutions exacerbate the deleterious impact of depreciations in developing countries.
These hypotheses are tested on an annual sample of 122 countries over the 1963-1994 period,
and are not rejected by the data. Our results suggest that short-term macroeconomic policy, in-
stitutional factors, and the interaction between the two, are potentially important determinants
of environmental outcomes.
Keywords: deforestation, real eﬀective exchange rate, institutions.
JEL: O13, Q23, F31, F41“La forêt ici manque et là s’est agrandie,” Victor Hugo, Les Rayons et les
Ombres
“Fear not till Birnam wood do come to Dunsinane,” William Shakespeare,
Macbeth
1 Introduction
In recent years, deforestation, particularly in developing countries, has been of increasing
concern, mainly because of widespread fears of global warming and declining biodiversity.
The 2003 World Development Report states that “one-ﬁfth of all tropical forests have been
cleared since 1960. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO), deforestation has been concentrated in the developing world. At the same
time, forest cover in industrial countries is stable or even increasing slightly.”12
Since land has several alternative uses, economic analysis can contribute to our un-
derstanding of the process of deforestation. On the one hand, forests allow for wood
production for domestic and export markets: wood may be used domestically for indus-
trial and ﬁrewood purposes, and timber products may be exported. On the other, forest
land is subject to encroachment by agricultural activities and grazing. The choice between
forest and agriculture use of the land depends, ceteris paribus, on the time preference of
individuals since wood production implies a long term investment in the forest. Since it
is often believed that discount rates are higher in poor countries than in rich countries, a
1 We thank Elisabeth Sadoulet for her careful reading of an early draft, as well as participants in
the “Cinquièmes journées scientiﬁques du Réseau analyse économique et développement de l’Agence
universitaire de la Francophonie (Economie de l’environnement et développement),” Montréal, Québec,
Canada, September 2001. We are particularly grateful to Henning Bohn and Robert T. Deacon for
providing us with their data on institutions. The usual disclaimer applies.
2 World Development Report 2003,p .3 .
1bias in favor of deforestation may exist in the former. Moreover, important institutional
issues arise because of the common property resource aspect of forests, as well as because
of poorly deﬁned property rights. These forms of market failure are usually held to be
more likely in developing countries. To whit, forest resources are often over-utilized in de-
veloping countries because individual property rights are neither established nor enforced.
The example of collective land resulting from forest clearing, and used for grazing, is a
case in point.
The alternative uses of forest land also lie behind the importance accorded to popula-
tion growth and agricultural development in the analysis of deforestation. These factors
have been the subject of a good deal of empirical microeconomic analysis (for a survey
see Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 1999). However, simple economic models, such as the three
good, two factor general equilibrium model sketched by Foster, Rosenzweig and Berhman
(1999), suggest that the impact of economic development on forest cover will depend upon
the relative rates of return to the forest and to alternative uses of the land in question. The
normal focus on factors which are associated with readily available data and amenable to
direct quantitative treatment explains why there has been relatively little work dealing ex-
plicitly with the impact of relative prices on forestation. In most microeconomic datasets,
there is little, if any, variation across households in the price of wood or in the price of
factor inputs, especially at the local level.3 Even if data on several regions dispersed
geographically do allow one to address the lack of variation in prices using microecono-
metric analysis, such data are rare.4 Even in this case, however, though the prices of
factor inputs (notably wages) are likely to vary, the price of wood is likely to be deter-
3 Angelsen and Kaimowitz (1999), p. 78.
4 See, e.g., Foster, Rosenzweig and Berhman (1999).
2mined internationally, and is therefore unlikely to display much variability on a regional
basis. The forest, though immobile (Macbeth and Birnam wood notwithstanding...), is in
fact an internationally tradable good whose price is determined largely on international
markets. This is obvious for exported timber, but it is also true for timber consumed by
local industry producing internationally traded goods such as paper or furniture, as it is
for ﬁrewood, which has ready substitutes in the form of imported petroleum products.
It is therefore clear that there is room for useful macroeconomic analyses of deforesta-
tion. Indeed, the numerous microeconomic studies of the factors that determine forest
area have dealt with a relatively limited number of countries and run the usual risks
inherent in using microeconomic studies to generalize concerning global processes. Most
importantly, a macroeconomic approach has less diﬃculty in accounting for the relative
return to the forest. This observation yields what we hold to be the most important
contribution of our paper: using macro panel data on deforestation allows us to take the
relative rate of return to the forest into account through macro-price indices such as the
relative price of wood to agricultural goods and the real exchange rate of each country.
Intuitively, it is clear that an increase in the relative price of wood should have a pos-
itive eﬀect on land under forest cover. The consequence of a change in the real exchange
rate is less obvious. The real exchange rate represents the price of tradables relative to
non-tradables and is a proxy for the price of wood (an internationally tradable good)
relative to the price of labor (wages), which is domestically determined. But it is also
a proxy for the price of agricultural goods relative to wages, provided that the agricul-
tural sector is not overly protected vis-à-vis the outside world. It is striking how sharp
currency devaluations in developing countries, leading to real exchange rate depreciation,
have resulted in deforestation. For instance, following the 50 percent devaluation of the
3CFA franc in 1994, heavy timber traﬃc on roads in Gabon increased, domestic furniture
production boomed in Abidjan and Dakar, carts carrying ﬁrewood proliferated in rural
Burkina Faso, and clearing obtained almost everywhere in the CFA franc area. Similarly,
after the collapse of the Indonesian rupiah in 1997, timber exports increased and wood
was substituted for petroleum products for domestic use.
One manifest inconvenience of the macroeconomic approach to deforestation is that
the FAO forest data, which are unique in being internationally comparable, have been
the subject of a good deal of criticism, which is clearly justiﬁed in many cases (Rudel
and Roper, 1997). In particular, the FAO uses extrapolations based on a hypothesized
relationship between forest cover and population to “ﬁll in” missing observations. On the
other hand, to the extent that such measurement error is country-speciﬁc and relatively
persistent over time, the use of appropriate econometric technique, such as country-speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀects, should allow one to temper the initial pessimism concerning the possibility
of obtaining valid results using these data.5
The aim of this paper is to understand why forest cover is decreasing in developing
countries while it is increasing in developed areas.6 Our line of reasoning is based on a
simple theoretical model which revolves around the choice facing an individual endowed
with a unit of forested land, and who has to decide whether to keep it as forest or
clear it and turn it into agricultural land. Higher discount rates and less developed
institutions provide a simple explanation for why more individuals in developing countries
are induced to deforest their land than is the case in developed countries. Moreover we
5 Moreover, their credibility is clearly high enough for the World Bank to use these data as part of its
overall assessment of sustainable development (World Development Indicators, 2002).
6 In the sample used in the regression results presented in the ﬁrst three columns of Table 2, the
annual rate of deforestation in the poorest quartile of observations is equal to 0.1 percent, whereas the
corresponding ﬁgure for the richest quartile of observations is equal to −0.2 percent.
4show, under plausible assumptions, that a depreciation of the real exchange rate increases
deforestation in developing countries and reduces deforestation in developed ones. Since
the real exchange rate has been appreciating in developed countries and depreciating in
the developing world, it may have contributed signiﬁcantly to deforestation at the global
level. Our model also allows us to simultaneously address the role of more traditional
factors that should aﬀect deforestation, such as population density or its growth rate.
Several authors have considered an environmental Kuznets curve for forest cover
(Panayotou,1993, Cropper and Griﬃths, 1994, Rock, 1996, Bhattarai and Hammig, 2001).
According to this hypothesis, the marginal impact of GDP per capita on deforestation is
positive for low levels of income, and becomes negative once a certain threshold level of
income has been reached. One of the most commonly-held justiﬁcations for its existence
is that: “logging and fuelwood uses of the forest are likely at ﬁrst to increase with in-
come. Agricultural and fuelwood motives for deforestation, however, are eventually likely
to decline with per capita GDP.”7 Another explanation is based on a threshold level
of income per capita above which the psychological value ascribed to “pristine forests”
becomes suﬃciently high for it to be in the interests of the population to reduce deforesta-
tion.8 This last argument suggests that it is diﬃcult to envisage testing for the presence
of a deforestation Kuznets curve without controlling for the relative price of the forest :
if psychological relative values are important, monetary relative values should be so as
well. The inclusion of the real exchange rate in such a speciﬁcation is therefore essential.
This paper is organized as follows. In part 2, we present our theoretical model and
derive a series of Propositions that describe the comparative statics of deforestation
7 Cropper and Griﬃths (1994), p. 252.
8 The expression “pristine forests” is from Angelsen and Kaimowitz (1999), p. 89.
5with respect to a number of key variables of interest, including the rate of time preference,
institutional quality relative prices, and income. In part 3, we set out the empirical coun-
terpart to our theoretical model, and highlight a series of easily testable (and refutable)
hypotheses. We then present our empirical results, based on estimation using country-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects on a panel of 122 countries over a thirty year time span. These results
largely corroborate the theoretical hypotheses set out in part 2.
2 A theoretical model of deforestation
2.1 Preliminaries
Consider a population of individuals each of whom is endowed with one unit of forested
land.9 Individuals are inﬁnitely lived and decide in the ﬁrst period of their lives what
to do with their endowment of land. All agents are blessed with perfect foresight. Two
choices are possible.
First, they may keep the land as forest, which yields a per period proﬁta tt i m et of
πF(t)=pB(t)qF(lF(t))−w(t)lF(t)−φ
F(t), where labor, denoted by l(t),i st h es o l evariable
factor input, w(t) i st h ew a g er a t e ,qF(.) is the production technology that turns labor
(and other ﬁxed factors) into wood output, and φ
F(t) are other ﬁx e dc o s t si n c u r e di nt h e
production process. The latter are essentially associated with the quality of institutions
(denoted by I), where we expect ∂φ
F(t)/∂I = φ
F
I (t) < 0.
The second choice involves turning the endowment of forest land into agricultural land
and, in the process, selling the wood that is obtained through clearing. In what follows, we
assume that the process of deforestation is irreversible. The sale of the wood from clearing
9 Note that one could begin with the alternative hypothesis that each individual is endowed with one
unit of agricultural land. This would lead to a model of reforestation (rather than deforestation), where
most of the arguments that follow would be reversed.
6yields a proﬁte q u a lt oπC(t)=pB(t)qC(lC(t))−w(t)lC(t)−φ
C(t), where qC(.) represents
the clearing technology, while agricultural use of the land yields πA(t)=pA(t)qA(lA(t))−
w(t)lA(t) − φ
A(t),w h e r eqA(.) is the agricultural production technology. In each of these
activities, individuals are assumed to minimize costs and to maximize proﬁts. Assuming
that each production technology is increasing and concave in l(t) yields conventional proﬁt
functions πF(pB(t),w(t);.), πC(pB(t),w(t);.), πA(pA(t),w(t);.) as well as conventional
costs functions Ci(qi(t),w(t);.),i= F,C,A that satisfy the usual properties, such as
Shephard’s or Hotelling’s Lemma. The theoretical model presented below will show that
the choice of whether to deforest or not will depend on (i) the rate of time preference,
(ii) the quality of institutions, (iii) relative prices, and (iv) other factors traditionally
associated with deforestation.
2.2 Choosing whether to deforest or not: the role of the rate of
time preference
From the outset, we pose the following hypotheses that will guarantee that the choice
between deforesting and keeping land under forest cover will not become degenerate.
Assumption 1: πC(pB(t),w(t);.) − πF(pB(t),w(t);.) > 0.
Assumption 2: πF(pB(t),w(t);.) − πA(pA(t),w(t);.) > 0.
Assumption 3: CF(qF(t),w(t);.)=CC(qC(t),w(t);.).
Assumption 1 states that the single period proﬁt from clearing a plot of land is
greater than the single period proﬁt from a “sustainable” harvesting of forest resources.
Assumption 2, on the other hand, states that the single-period proﬁtf r o ms u s t a i n a b l e
harvesting of forest resources is greater than the corresponding proﬁtf r o ms w i t c h i n g
the land into agriculture. Assumption 2 is crucial in that, were it not to be satisﬁed,
7it would be individually rational to deforest all land. Assumption 1c o m b i n e dw i t h
Assumption 2 implies that there is an interesting tradeoﬀ involved in deforestation. On
the one hand, clearing yields a one-shot single period proﬁt that is larger than what one
would obtain from sustainable harvesting of forest resources. On the other hand, this
short-term increase in proﬁts is tempered by the fact that one then loses the diﬀerence
between πF and πA (which is positive by Assumption 2) for all successive periods.
The tradeoﬀ between short-term gains to clearing and long-term losses to having cleared
constitutes the crux of our model, and invariably leads to a key role for an individual’s
discount rate.
Assumption 3 is not crucial (and can be weakened somewhat), but simply translates
the intuitively appealing notion that Assumption 1s t e m sn o tf r o md i ﬀerences in costs
of clearing versus costs of sustainably harvesting the forest, but rather from the greater
revenue one obtains by clearing all trees oﬀ the land (and thus rendering it amenable to
agricultural activity) versus harvesting forest resources sustainably.








If one assumes that the proﬁt from sustainable forest use is the same in each period and



























where we assume that agricultural proﬁt obtains only in the period following clearing (i.e.,





































Assume that individuals diﬀer according to their discount rate r. More formally, suppose
that the discount rate r is distributed in the population according to the probability














This assumption states that the gain to clearing (with respect to sustainable harvesting
of the forest) must be “suﬃciently” large relative to the loss in proﬁts stemming from
conversion to agriculture. Essentially, this is a technical condition which, as will be
shown below, ensures that some individuals do in fact choose to deforest their land. Let
r∗ be the “limit” discount rate such that an individual is just indiﬀerent between leaving


















The deﬁnition of r∗ given in equation 1 constitutes the basis of all of the theoretical
results that follow. Assumptions 1a n d2i m p l yt h a tr∗ > 0, since both the denominator
and the numerator of this expression will then be positive, while the assumption made
9above guarantees that r∗ < r . It follows that r∗ ∈ [0,r] and that some portion of the
population will choose to deforest their land, while the remainder will chose to keep their
land under forest cover. Assumption 2, on the other hand, implies that ∆W = WF−WA







where the sign follows directly from Assumption 2. Consider now the limits of ∆W as






























∗ − r) < 0
The relationship is illustrated in Figure 1.
Intuitively, individuals such that r ∈ [0,r ∗] choose to keep their land under forest cover
s i n c et h e i rd i s c o u n tr a t ei s“ l o w ” :t h e yt h e r e f o r ep u tm o r ew e i g h to nt h el o s si np r o ﬁts
stemming from conversion to agricultural activity than on the short-term gains to clearing.
Individuals with r ∈ [r∗,r] choose to clear: they put relatively more weight on the short-
term gains to clearing than on the intertemporal losses stemming from conversion to
agricultural activities. The preceding results immediately yield the following important
Proposition:10
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, deforestation is an increasing function of
the average discount rate of the population.
10 All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
10Figure 1: Individuals to the left of r∗ keep their land under forest cover, individuals to
the right of r∗ deforest.
Proposition 1 implies that if the average discount rate in the population decreases
as per capita income increases, deforestation should decrease. Conversely, the poorer a
country, and thus the greater the average discount rate of the population, the greater
should be deforestation.
In the following sections, we consider the comparative statics of deforestation with
respect to ﬁve diﬀerent changes in the underlying environment. Formally, all proofs are
based on the comparative statics of r∗. We begin with the impact of institutions, followed
by the main topic of this paper, relative prices, with a focus on the eﬀect on deforestation
of increases in the relative price of timber and depreciations of the real exchange rate. We
also show that, under reasonable assumptions, the impact of depreciations will be diﬀerent
in developing and developed countries. We then consider the impact on deforestation of
demographic factors, and conclude the subsection with a discussion of the environmental
Kuznets curve.
112.3 The quality of institutions
Among the determinants of deforestation, institutions are often held to play a leading
role. In what follows, we show how institutional concerns can easily be incorporated into
the basic model. We then derive the comparative statics of deforestation with respect to
institutions.
While it is clear that institutions aﬀect the proﬁts associated with all three forms
of activity (sustainable forest harvesting, clearing, and agricultural production), it is
probably not unreasonable to assume that it is sustainable harvesting of forest products
that is most sensitive to the existence of clear property rights and their enforcement (see
Bohn and Deacon, 2000). By its very nature, agricultural production entails “living on the
land,” while clearing is often associated with “hit and run” operations, and may indeed be
a means of establishing squatters’ rights to agricultural land. As such, our basic working
hypothesis shall be that πA(pA,w) and πC(pB,w) are unaﬀected by institutional concerns,
whereas πF = πF(pB,w;I),πF
I > 0,w h e r eI denotes institutions (with a higher value of I
denoting better institutions). Strictly-speaking, it is of course not true that πA(pA,w) is
unaﬀected by institutional concerns: for example, decisions surrounding the maintenance
of land quality and investment are intimately related to institutional arrangements. On
the other hand, our assumption is not meant to translate strict independence, only that
πF is more sensitive to institutions than are πA and πC. The comparative statics in this
case are particularly easy to establish, and immediately yield the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, an improvement in institutions reduces
deforestation.
In terms of the graphical illustration given by Figure 1, an improvement in institutions
shifts r∗ towards the right (dr∗
dI > 0), thereby reducing the proportion of the population
12that wishes to clear its endowment of forest land. If institutional underdevelopment is a
characteristic of developing countries, as is a high rate of time preference, then our model
clearly predicts greater rates of deforestation in developing countries than in developed
countries.
2.4 Changes in relative prices
Deﬁne the relative price of timber as pR =
pB
pA and the real exchange rate as e =
pT
pNT,
where pT is the price of tradables and pNT the price of non-tradables. Given the simple
structure of our model, pT =( pB)1−α(pA)α,w h e r eα is the share of agricultural production
in total output of tradables, and pNT is entirely determined by the domestic wage, which

































α ,w;.) − πF (e(pR)
α ,w;.)
(2)
2.4.1 The relative price of timber
Consider a permanent change in the relative price of timber. The following Proposition
is immediate:
Proposition 3 Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, a permanent increase in the relative
price of timber reduces deforestation.
Proposition 3 stems from the limit value r∗ being an increasing function of the
relative price of timber. Graphically, an increase in pR shifts r∗ to the right in Figure 1
( dr∗
dpR > 0).
132.4.2 The real exchange rate
A key aspect of our model is that it generates opposite comparative statics results for
developing and developed countries concerning the impact of changes in the real exchange
rate on the incentives to engage in deforestation. Recall that a depreciation in the real
exchange rate (an increase in the price of tradables versus non-tradables) may aﬀect the
real price of timber and of agricultural goods (with respect to the numeraire). First,
a depreciation increases the relative price of exported timber. Second, a depreciation
increases the return to timber-consuming activities that produce internationally traded
goods (such as paper or furniture). This is true whether the goods in question are destined
for the export market or compete with imports. Third, a depreciation increases the
relative price of energy (oil, gas and electricity) and thus the price of wood for heating and
cooking. Finally, a depreciation increases the return to agricultural activities, irrespective
of whether these are constituted by export or food crops (some of which may compete
with imported products).
Our basic result is that real depreciations result in an increase in deforestation in
developing countries, whereas the opposite obtains in developed countries. Three dif-
ferent hypotheses can generate this result. The ﬁrst approach contrasts developing and
developed countries in terms of the relative costs of sustainable forest harvesting versus
agricultural production, and focuses on changes in the real exchange rate that are seen
as being permanent. The second explanation is based on the assumption that, in gen-
eral, variations in the real exchange rate are perceived as being temporary phenomena
in developing countries: we show that, when a depreciation is seen as being temporary,
it will always increase deforestation. Finally, when protectionism results in agricultural
14goods becoming non-tradables (as is arguably the case for the agricultural sectors of most
developed countries), a depreciation always results in a decrease in deforestation.
We begin with the comparative statics of a permanent increase in the real exchange
rate. The crucial hypotheses that we need are summarized in the following Assumptions.
Assumption 4: For developing countries, CF(qF(t),w(t);.) <C A(qA(t),w(t);.).
Assumption 5: For developed countries, CF(qF(t),w(t);.) >C A(qA(t),w(t);.).
Assumptions 4a n d5c a nbej u s t i ﬁed by assuming that agriculture is extremely labor-
intensive in developing countries. Since labor costs will constitute the most important
element of CA in developing countries, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that
CF <C A. In developed countries, on the other hand, agriculture is much less labor-
intensive, whereas forest-harvesting technologies are not always of an industrial nature:
assuming that CF >C A therefore would appear to be reasonable for developed countries.
With these Assumptions in hand, we then have the following Proposition:
Proposition 4 Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3:
(i) when Assumption 4 holds (i.e., for less developed countries) a depreciation of the
real exchange rate increases deforestation;
(ii) when Assumption 5 holds (i.e., for developed countries), a depreciation of the
real exchange rate reduces deforestation.
Proposition 4(i) is based on the fact that, for less developed countries, dr∗
de < 0. In
Figure 1, this means that a depreciation shifts r∗ to the left. It follows that a depreciation
(an increase in e) will increase deforestation in developing countries, whereas (by Propo-
sition 4(ii)) the opposite (dr∗
de > 0) will occur in developed countries. Proposition 4i s
readily amenable to empirical testing, as we shall show below.
We now consider our second explanation for the deleterious impact on deforestation, in
developing countries, of depreciations in the real exchange rate. Why would depreciations
15be more likely to be considered temporary in developing countries than in developed
countries? Casual empiricism suggests that, since the ﬂoating of exchange rates at the
begining of the 1970s, all countries have suﬀered from a great deal of volatility in their
real exchange rates, with that aﬀecting developing countries being signiﬁcantly greater.
Most producers in these countries have therefore grown used to wide ﬂuctuations in the
real exchange rate. It follows that there is a widespread belief in these countries that
most variations in the real exchange rate are transitory.11
Consider then a temporary increase in the real exchange rate, which lasts one period
(more precisely, it last only for the ﬁr s tp e r i o d ) .T h i si se q u i v a l e n tt oa ni n i t i a lv a l u eo f
e(0) = e, followed thereafter by a real exchange rate e(t)=e,t > 0, with e<e. In this




































































































































α ,w) − πF (e(pR)
α ,w)
(3)
11 This intuition is conﬁrmed in our data. In the poorest quartile of the sample used in the estimations
p r e s e n t e di nt h eﬁrst three columns of Table 2, the standard deviation of the real eﬀective exchange rate
is equal to 52.2, whereas in the richest quartile, the corresponding ﬁgure is 30.8.
16It is then easy to establish the following result:
Proposition 5 Under Assumptions 1 and 3, a temporary depreciation increases de-
forestation.
In terms of Figure 1, a temporary increase in the real exchange rate results in a leftward
shift in the limit value e r∗ (de r∗
de < 0), and thus yields an increase in deforestation, contrary
to the impact of a permanent increase in the same variable.
Note that a third explanation for the diﬀerence in the impact of a depreciation of
the real exchange rate between developing and developed countries can be furnished by
assuming that, because of protectionist agricultural policies in developed countries, agri-
cultural goods should not be considered as tradables. We summarize this idea in the
following Proposition:
Proposition 6 Suppose that agricultural output is non-tradable; then a permanent de-
preciation reduces deforestation.
Essentially, Proposition 6s t e m sf r o mt h ef a c tt h a ta ni n c r e a s ei ne,w h e na g r i c u l -
tural output is non-tradable, yields the same result as an increase in the relative price of
timber (considered in Proposition 3): a depreciation therefore results in a decrease in
deforestation in this case (since dr∗
de > 0).
To summarize, our main arguments concerning the impact of real depreciations on
deforestation are that in developing countries, an increase in e increases deforestation.
This eﬀect obtains either because (i) the depreciation is perceived as being permanent
concomitantly with Assumption 4h o l d i n g( Proposition 4(i)); or (ii) the increase in e
is perceived as being temporary (Proposition 5). In contrast, in developed countries an
increase in e decreases deforestation, and this obtains either (i) because the increase in e is
permanent and Assumption 5h o l d s( Proposition 4(ii)); or (ii) agricultural output is
17non-tradable because of protectionism; an increase in e is then equivalent to a permanent
increase in the relative price of timber (Propositions 3a n d6 ) .
2.4.3 The interaction of institutions and the real exchange rate
Of equal interest, given our focus on the impact of relative prices, is how institutions
aﬀect the marginal impact of the real exchange rate on deforestation. In this case, the























































In order to determine the sign of equation 4, some additional structure is needed in terms
of how exactly institutions aﬀect proﬁts stemming from sustainable harvesting. Recall
from our preliminaries that we see weak institutions as imposing a ﬁxed cost on sustainable
harvesting: πF = pBqF(lF) − wlF − φ
F
I (I), where φ
F




I (I) > 0,C F
I = φ
F
I (I) < 0 and qF
I =0 . W et h e nh a v et h ef o l l o w i n g
Proposition, which is essentially a corollary to Proposition 4:
Proposition 7 Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3:
(i) when Assumption 4 holds (i.e., for developing countries), an improvement in
institutions exacerbates the marginal impact of a depreciation on deforestation;
(ii) when Assumption 5 holds (i.e., for developed countries), the impact of an im-
provement in institutions on the marginal eﬀect of the exchange rate on deforestation is
ambiguous.
Recall that Proposition 4(i) has established that a depreciation of the real exchange
rate increases the rate of deforestation in developing countries. Proposition 7 (i), for its
part, shows that there are two eﬀects, of opposite signs, of institutions in terms of their
18impact on deforestation in developing countries. On the one hand, the result established
earlier (Proposition 2) shows that institutional strengthening has an unambiguously
beneﬁcial impact in that it reduces deforestation. On the other hand, a strengthening of
institutions exacerbates the deleterious eﬀects of depreciations of the real exchange rate
(because d2r∗
dIde < 0).
2.5 Traditional factors aﬀecting deforestation
2.5.1 Demographic factors
There exists a vast literature that considers the impact of demographic factors on de-
forestation. The ﬁndings of this literature are ambiguous and sometimes contradictory.
Population growth or increases in population density are often held to increase defor-
estation, although it is sometimes posited that, beyond a certain threshold, they induce
technological change in agriculture that slows the process (Boserup, 1965; see Angelsen
and Kaimowitz, 1999, for a survey of this literature). It is worth emphasizing, however,
that most work on this topic bases its analysis of the impact of population factors on
d e f o r e s t a t i o no nt h ee ﬀect of the former on relative prices (for example, through changes
in the wage rate or in food prices). As such, the price variables considered above should
already be accounting for many of the eﬀects of population pressures. For example, if
population growth leads to lower wages, this would be translated in our model by a de-
preciation of the real exchange rate. The results presented in Propositions 4, 5 and 6
therefore apply. In particular, our results imply that population pressures should, through
their impact on relative prices, increase deforestation in developing countries.
192.5.2 The Kuznets curve
Several authors have considered that the marginal impact of GDP per capita may be
positive for low levels of income and negative for high levels. As we recalled in the intro-
duction, the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis, applied to the forest, is based on
various arguments. The ﬁrst explanation assumes that during the early stages of devel-
opment, logging or ﬁre wood demand are on the rise while forest clearing for agricultural
activities or grazing also increase. After a threshold level of development is reached, these
factors are dampened by the diversiﬁcation of activities into the industrial and service
sectors, as well as by urbanisation. As in the case of population pressures, the impact
of these factors on deforestation operates through changes in relative prices, which are
already accounted for in our model. An alternative explanation of a potential Kuznets
curve for deforestation is based on the psychological value ascribed to pristine forests,
which is assumed to be decreasing during the early phases of development and increasing
thereafter. In the framework of our model, this hypothesis corresponds to a very particular
r e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nt h ea v e r a g er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c eo ft h ep o p u l a t i o na n dG D Pp e r
capita. Instead of being a monotonically decreasing function, the average discount rate
of the population may at ﬁrst be an increasing function of GDP per capita (because of a
highly pressing need to improve living standards) and, after a threshold level of income is
reached, this relationship may turn negative. To test for the presence of an environmental
Kuznets curve, we shall introduce GDP per capita, as well as GDP per capita squared,
into the speciﬁcation.12
12 The Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect states that the equilibrium real exchange rate appreciates as GDP per
capita increases. Assume for argument’s sake that this relationship is linear. If, as we have shown, the
marginal eﬀect of the real exchange rate on deforestation is a function of the level of GDP per capita
(Propositions 4, 5 and 6) and takes a multiplicative form then, by substitution of the Balassa-Samuelson
eﬀect, one obtains by construction, an inverse environmental Kuznets curve, in which deforestation will
203E c o n o m e t r i c s p e c i ﬁcation and results
3.1 The estimating equation
Our basic econometric speciﬁc a t i o ni sg i v e nb ya ne q u a t i o ni nw h i c ht h ed e p e n d e n tv a r i -
able is the rate of deforestation, and where the explanatory variables are those suggested
by our theoretical model. Formally-speaking, assume that there exists a steady-state
level of the logarithm of forest cover in country i at time t, lnTF∗
i,t , as determined by
our theoretical model, and that the dynamics of forest cover can be described by a non-
linear ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equation that is given by lnTF
i,t = θ(lnTF
i,t−1).B yaﬁrst-order
























,e v a l u a t e da tlnTF∗
i,t . Subtracting lnTF









































+ Xitγ + λt + µi + εit (5)
where φ(.) is a polynomial in the initial level of forest cover (in order to allow for more
complex non-linear dynamics than would be possible with the simple linear speciﬁcation
suggested by (1 − θ
0)lnTF
i,t−1), Xit is a matrix of explanatory variables corresponding to
be ﬁrst decreasing and then increasing in GDP per capita. It follows that if, aside from exchange rate
eﬀects, there are reasons to expect an environmental Kuznets curve, it may be obscured by the inverted
Kuznets curve generated by the real exchange rate, if the real exchange rate is not explicitly included as
an explanatory variable in the empirical speciﬁcation.
21those determinants of the steady-state level of forest cover identiﬁed in our theoretical
work, λt is a time-speciﬁce ﬀect, µi is a country-speciﬁce ﬀect, and εit is a disturbance
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where Dit represents demographic variables. Restricting our attention to a third-degree
polynomial for φ(.) yields the following empirical speciﬁcation:13

















itγ2 + Iitγ3 + p
R
itγ4
+eitγ5 + yiteitγ6 + Iiteitγ7 + Ditγ8
+λt + µi + εit
Our theoretical results suggest the following predictions on the partial derivatives of zit
with respect to the various dependent variables:
Table 1. Theoretical predictions
13 The reader familiar with the existing econometric literature on the determinants of deforestation
will have noted that we explicitly consider the dynamics of deforestation, which we model as a ﬁrst-
order diﬀerence equation. Just as it is appropriate to write a conventional growth of GDP per capita
equation while allowing for convergence eﬀects through the inclusion of the initial level of GDP per capita,
one should include the initial level of forest cover as an explanatory variable. Most existing empirical
treatments of the question have not taken this key fact into account.
22Proposition 1 a higher discount rate (proxied by lower GDP per capita)
increases deforestation: ∂zit
∂yit = γ1 < 0
Proposition 2 better institutions reduce deforestation:
∂zit
∂Iit = γ3 < 0




= γ4 < 0
Propositions 4, a depreciation in the real exchange rate increases deforestation
5a n d6 in developing countries and reduces deforestation in developed
countries; econometrically, this is tested through the
hypotheses that ∂zit
∂eit = γ5 > 0, ∂zit
∂(yiteit) = γ6 < 0, with e y
being deﬁned as the value of y such that: ∂zit
∂eit + e y ∂zit
∂(yiteit) =0
Proposition 7 for developing countries, better institutions exacerbate the
the deleterious eﬀect of depreciations of the real exchange rate
∂zit
∂(Iiteit) = γ7 > 0
3.2 The data
Our dependent variable is the annual rate of deforestation (minus the diﬀerence in log-
arithms of forest area, expressed in thousands of hectares), when forest area is strictly
positive (source: FAO, The State of the World’s Forests, various years). GDP per capita
and demographic variables are from the World Bank’s World Tables. Note that, accord-
ing to our theoretical model, the average rate of time preference of the population is a
key determinant of deforestation. It would have been appropriate to proxy this variable
by the long-term interest rate. Unfortunately, such an interest rate is unavailable for
most developing countries, and the corresponding short-term rates, that are available, are
23subject to so much short-run variation that it is diﬃcult to see them proxying for the
rate of time preference. Since the average discount rate of the population is likely to be a
decreasing function of GDP per capita, the latter will constitute our proxy for r, although
it is diﬃcult to identify the time preference eﬀect alone with this variable.
Our measures of institutions are given by two types of variables. First, we consider the
indicator developed by Bohn and Deacon (2000), who construct an index of ownership risk
(given by the probability of expropriation π), by postulating that ownership risk is related
to observable political attributes of countries (political instability and types of government
regimes).14 They then use cross-country data on the investment rate and political
characteristics to estimate the form of the relationship. They then construct “an index
of ownership security, a monotone decreasing function of π ... by multiplying together
the political variables and coeﬃcients (of the previous regression) and summing.”15 The
second measure of institutions we use comes from Freedom House’s Freedom in the World
Survey.16 “The Survey rates countries based on real world situations caused by state
and nongovernmental factors.” It encompasses two general sets of characteristics grouped
under political rights (index 1) and civil liberties (index 2). The countries are rated from
1 to 7 for each index with the quality of institutions decreasing with the value of the
indices. In order to facilitate the reading of our econometric results, we have inverted the
scale, with the poorest institutions corresponding to 0 and the best to 6.17
14 They use the indicators of political institutions developed by Banks, 1990.
15 We are very grateful to Henning Bohn and Robert T. Deacon for providing us with their index. This
comprises 3146 observations and has been used with success by the authors in their explanations of oil
discovery and production, as well as deforestation.
16 Available online at www.freedomhouse.org.
17 We also carried out estimations using measures of institutions drawn from the POLITY project.
This is a source of cross-national, longitudinal data on the degree of democracy and autocracy, available
in its most recent version from the Centre for International Development and Conﬂict Management at
24The relative price of timber pR
it is approximated by the ratio of the price of wood from
all sources quoted in London (source: IMF, International Financial Statistics,v a r i o u s
issues) to the country-speciﬁc unit export values of agricultural goods (source: FAO). The














ijt is the nominal exchange rate index of country i versus country j (expressed in
terms of the national currency), pit is the consumer price index in country i (and similarly
for j), αj represents the share in country i’s imports furnished by country j,a n dw h e r e
the js are constituted by the ten most important (non-oil) trading partners of country i
(these shares are given by the average values for the period 1980-6; the source for all these
data is the IMF).18 Note that an increase in this index corresponds to a real depreciation.
Descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in the econometric work are presented
in Table 2.
3.3 Results
Our econometric results, obtained after the within transformation (in order to account
for µi in equation 6), and the inclusion of time dummies (to account for λt) are presented
in Table 3.19 In columns (1) to (3) we present results corresponding to the Bohn and
Deacon index of expropriation risk. In columns (4) and (5), in contrast, our institutional
variable is given by the Freedom House indices of political freedom.
the University of Maryland. None of the available indicators from this source was found to be statistically
signiﬁcant in our empirical work.
18 Note that, when pit or pjt were missing, they were replaced by the domestic GDP deﬂator.
19 For the sake of brevity we do not present the coeﬃcients associated with the time dummies in Table
3.
25In column (1), which corresponds to the speciﬁcation suggested by our theoretical
work, we include two demographic variables (the population growth rate and rural popu-
lation density). Both are statistically insigniﬁcant, suggesting that our intuition that the
impact of these variables operates through relative prices is indeed conﬁrmed in the data.
In all subsequent results, the demographic variables are therefore dropped, since their in-
clusion did not aﬀect the results and the coeﬃcients associated with these variables were
never statistically diﬀerent from zero.
Regardless of the institutional variable used (the Bohn and Deacon index or either
of the Freedom House indices), the basic empirical results remain largely the same, and
are the following. First, the coeﬃcient associated with the relative price of timber is
negative in all speciﬁcations, and statistically signiﬁcant when the Bohn and Deacon
index of expropriation risk is our institutional variable. As predicted by Proposition 3,
an increase in the relative price of timber decreases deforestation.
Second, the coeﬃcient associated with the real exchange rate is positive and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant, while that associated with the real exchange rate times the log of GDP
per capita is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. This conﬁrms the theoretical predic-
tions of Propositions 4, 5 and 6: a real depreciation increases deforestation in poor
countries, with the eﬀect becoming negative once a threshold level of GDP per capita is
reached. This threshold level varies from $US 790 (corresponding to 32.4 percent of the
sample) in column 4, to $US 1340 (corresponding to 47.2 percent of the sample) in column
3. Clearly the threshold is operative, whatever its precise level may be, and there is indeed
a crisp separation between the behavior of deforestation with respect to depreciations in
t h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ei np o o ra n dr i c hc o u n t r i e s . 20
20 Table 3 presents the threshold level of GDP for each speciﬁcation. Note that, because of the
26Third, the coeﬃcient associated with institutions is negative and statistically signiﬁ-
cant, while the coeﬃcient associated with institutions times the real exchange is positive
and statistically signiﬁcant. The ﬁr s tr e s u l ti sc o n s i s t e n tw i t hProposition 2, in that
better institutions do indeed reduce deforestation, while the second result conﬁrms the
prediction of Proposition 7, that better institutions exacerbate the deleterious eﬀects
of depreciations in developing countries (recall that Proposition 7a l s os h o w e dt h a t
this relationship was ambiguous for developed countries). The marginal impact of insti-
tutions on the rate of deforestation, evaluated at the mean value of the real exchange
rate, is positive, though never statistically distinguishable from zero at the usual levels
of conﬁdence.21 This brings into sharp focus the importance of clearly separating the
eﬀect of institutions into their direct eﬀect versus the eﬀe c tt h a to p e r a t e st h r o u g ht h e
real exchange rate.
Fourth, in column 3 we test for the presence of an environmental Kuznets curve, which
would correspond to a positive coeﬃcient associated with GDP per capita and a negative
coeﬃcient associated with GDP per capita squared: it should be clear that no evidence
exists for an environmental Kuznets curve. Finally, according to our results, the total
marginal impact of log GDP per capita on the rate of deforestation varies between 0.005
and 0.0007, with none of these marginal impacts being signiﬁcant at the usual levels of
conﬁdence.22 While this does not conﬁrm Proposition 1, the empirical result is not
multiplicative terms, the total marginal impact of the real exchange rate on deforestation is given by:
dzit
deit = γ5 + yitγ6 + Iitγ7, which implies that the threshold level of GDP per capita below which the




/γ6,w h e r eIit is the
mean level of the indicator of institutional quality.
21 The total marginal eﬀect of institutions on the rate of deforestation is given by dzit
dIit = γ3+eitγ7, where
eit is the average value of the real eﬀective exchange rate in the sample.
22 The total marginal eﬀect of log GDP per capita on the rate of deforestation is given by dzit
dyit =
γ1 +2 yitγ2 + eitγ6.
27surprizing per se in that GDP per capita proxies for other eﬀects, above and beyond those
associated with the rate of time preference.
How important has real exchange rate depreciation been in terms of its impact on
deforestation in the developing world, andw h a ta r et h er e l a t i v eo r d e r so fm a g n i t u d e
involved? Consider the empirical results presented in column 4 of Table 3. The average
annual depreciation of the real exchange rate in those countries with GDP per capita
below the threshold level of 790 dollars was equal to 1.3 percent. If we use the coeﬃcient
estimates to compute the predicted annual rate of deforestation and compare it with the
predicted annual rate of deforestation had the real exchange rate been 1.3 percent higher
each year, the mean diﬀerence is equal to 0.025 percent. Given that the average annual rate
of deforestation in these countries was equal to 0.11 percent, the absence of real exchange
rate depreciation in poor countries would have reduced their mean rate of deforestation by
23 percent (0.025 ÷ 0.11 = 0.227). In contrast, institutional quality has improved in the
same sample of countries by 0.02552 points (on the Freedom House scale) per year. Had
this institutional strengthening not obtained, similar simulations yield a mean increase in
the annual rate of deforestation of 9.57 × 10−4, which corresponds to an increase of 0.8
percent ((9.57×10−4)÷0.11 = 0.008). The small reduction in deforestation that has been
achieved by the strengthening of institutions has therefore been overwhelmingly wiped out
by real exchange rate depreciation. Our results highlight how avoiding real exchange rate
depreciation would have signiﬁcantly reduced deforestation in the developing world.
4C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
The main ﬁnding of this paper involves the impact of the real eﬀective exchange rate
on deforestation: our econometric results do not reject the null hypothesis that real
28depreciations increase deforestation in poor countries and decrease deforestation in rich
countries. Given that economic policy over the past two decades has tended to favor real
depreciation in the developing world (in contrast to what has obtained in the developed
world), it has tended to exacerbate the process of deforestation. Simulations based on our
empirical results show that real exchange rate depreciation is responsible for one quarter
of the deforestation experienced by poor countries over the past 15 years.
In the long run, our results suggest that it is likely that the major determinant of
deforestation at the global level will be constituted by the relative rates of growth of
the developing and developed worlds, and the impact that this process will have on real
exchange rates. If convergence obtains, real eﬀective exchange rates will appreciate in
poor countries and depreciate in rich countries, leading to a reduction in deforestation.
On the other hand, an increase in inequality at the international level (divergence) will
lead to a depreciation of the real eﬀective exchange rates of the developing world, leading
to an increase in deforestation.
Our results also highlight the importance of international markets for agricultural
exports and timber, as well as the key role played by institutions, in terms of their impact
on deforestation. Improvements in institutional quality will have a beneﬁcial (negative)
eﬀect on deforestation in developing countries, as long as they are not accompagnied by
real exchange rate depreciation.
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r∗ f(r;µr)dr =1− F(r∗;µr), where µr =
R r
0 rf(r;µr)dr is the average
discount rate in the population and F(r;µr) is the cumulative density function associated
with f(r;µr).T h ed e ﬁnition of First-Order Stochastic Dominance is that Fµr(r∗;µr) < 0.
It follows that dTA
dµr = −Fµr(r∗;µr) > 0. [QED]
Proof of Proposition 2. Straigthforward diﬀerentiation of the expression for r∗





















































By Hotelling’s Lemma, we know that d
dpπ(p,w)=q(p,w) (i.e., the derivative of the proﬁt
function with respect to the output price is equal to the supply function). Therefore,
πF
pB = qF,πA
pA = qA, and πC


































































πF − πA + CF − CA
















αCF +( 1− α)CA + πA
α(πC − πF)
!
It will therefore always be the case (since πC > πF by Assumption 1) that dr∗
dpR > 0.










Proof of Proposition 4. As with the proof of the previous Proposition, Hotelling’s





















































πF − πA + CF − CA












πF − πA + CF − CA









Under Assumptions 1 and 2, and Assumption 4( CF <C A), it will therefore be the
case that dr∗












it follows that a depreciation (an increase in e) will increase deforestation in developing
countries, whereas the opposite will occur in developed countries. [QED]










































































































































































































πC (pB,w) − πF (pB,w)+∆e
e [πC − πF + CC − CF]











πC (pB,w) − πF (pB,w)+∆e
e [πC − πF]











πC (pB,w) − πF (pB,w)+∆e










πC (pB,w) − πF (pB,w)
= r
∗.[QED]
Proof of Proposition 6.T h i si se q u i v a l e n tt or e d e ﬁning prices as pA = pA =,p B =
e, from which it follows that
r
∗ =




πC (e,w;.) − πF (e,w;.)
It is then immediate that an increase in e in this case will yield the same result as an
increase in the relative price of timber (considered in Proposition 3): a depreciation
therefore results in a decrease in deforestation.[QED]
Proof of Proposition 7. Using the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition
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Recall from our preliminaries that we see weak institutions as imposing a ﬁxed cost on
sustainable harvesting: πF = pBqF(lF)−wlF −φ
F
I (I), where φ
F




I (I) > 0,C F
I = φ
F
I (I) < 0 and qF
























From Proposition 4 (i), which holds when Assumption 4i sv a l i d ,w ek n o wt h a tdr∗
de < 0












,i m p l y i n gt h a td2r∗
dIde < 0.F o r d e v e l o p e d
countries, on the other hand, Proposition 4 (ii) tells us that dr∗
de > 0; the term in square
brackets is therefore of ambiguous sign and so is d2r∗
dIde . [QED]
35Table 2. Descriptive statistics (2063 observations)
Mean Median Standard
deviation
Annual rate of deforestation 0.00097 0.0000 0.0164
Log forest cover (in thousands of hectares) 8.4929 8.9186 2.2968
Log Real eﬀective exchange rate 4.2993 4.2747 0.4292
Log GDP per capita 7.5538 7.3510 1.5199
Population growth rate 2.09 2.31 1.08
Rural population density 116.83 35.29 404.67
Relative price of timber to agricultural exports 127.06 99.99 139.83
Bohn and Deacon index of expropriation risk 12.72 13.20 4.11
Freedom House index 1 of political freedom 3.33 3.00 2.15
Freedom House index 2 of political freedom 3.34 3.00 1.84
Note: descriptive statistics for the Freedom House indices correspond to the sample
with 2196 observations used in the estimation results presented in columns 4 and 5 of
Table 3.
36Table 3. “Within” estimation of the determinants of the annual rate of
deforestation
Institutional variable Bohn and Deacon Freedom House index
index of expropriation risk Index 1 Index 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log initial forest cover 1.156 1.157 1.163 0.535 0.537
(19.78) (20.41) (20.56) (28.58) (28.69)
Log initial forest cover, squared −0.134 −0.134 −0.134 −0.061 −0.062
(−17.60) (−18.01) (−18.09) (−13.54) (−13.79)
Log initial forest cover, cube 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.002
(15.47) (15.72) (15.68) (8.66) (8.93)
Log GDP per capita 0.020 0.020 −0.006 0.050 0.050
(2.92) (2.92) (−0.53) (7.24) (7.14)
Log GDP per capita, squared 0.002
(3.07)
Institutions −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.012 −0.013
(−1.97) (−2.01) (−2.16) (−2.71) (−2.44)
Relative price of timber −0.0008 −0.0010 −0.0010 −0.0006 −0.0006
(−2.54) (−3.23) (−3.53) (−1.59) (−1.58)
Log real eﬀective exchange rate 0.016 0.017 0.022 0.064 0.062
(1.80) (1.84) (2.35) (6.29) (6.13)
Log real eﬀective exchange rate −0.004 −0.004 −0.005 −0.011 −0.011
× log GDP per capita (−2.60) (−2.66) (−3.09) (−7.04) (−6.91)
Log real eﬀective exchange rate 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003
× Institutions (2.19) (2.24) (2.40) (2.71) (2.40)
Population growth rate 0.0002
(0.33)
Rural population density −3 × 10−6
(−0.43)
R
2 0.346 0.345 0.348 0.387 0.386
Number of observations 2063 2064 2064 2197 2197
Threshold level of log GDP per 7.0155 7.0109 7.2005 6.6728 6.6755
capita below which dT F
de < 0 (s.e.) (0.3811) (0.3751) (0.3091) (0.2162) (0.2225)
Corresponding level in $US 1990 1113 1108 1340 790 792
% of observations below threshold 43.34 3 .34 7 .23 2 .43 2 .4
Marg. eﬀect of institutions at mean 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.008 0.009
v a l u eo fr e a le x c h a n g er a t e( t - s t a t ) (1.07) (1.12) (1.18) (1.83) (1.68)
Marg. eﬀect of log GDP per capita 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005
at ﬁrst quartile of real exchange rate (1.64) (1.55) (1.45) (1.73) (1.92)
Marg. eﬀect of log GDP per capita 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
at median of real exchange rate (1.22) (1.11) (0.94) (0.77) (0.97)
Marg. eﬀect of log GDP per capita 0.001 0.001 0.0008 0.0001 0.0007
at third quartile of real exchang rate (0.73) (0.60) (0.36) (0.03) (0.23)
Note: t-stastistics in parentheses unless otherwise noted.
37